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Abstract: Due to structural changes in journalism, such as deregulation, privatisation and the 
influence of new technologies, it has become increasingly important to study media accountability 
(MA). By applying Bourdieu’s theory of social fields, this paper proposes a new approach to do so: 
MA is defined as a function of both journalistic autonomy and influence in the media field. Here, 
online communication potentially widens the scope of action for media’s transparency, 
responsiveness as well as the articulation of media criticism by a variety of actors. In Israel, media 
criticism is driven by the agent’s struggle for interpretive authority over public discourse in a 
politically polarized society. Semi-structured interviews with Israeli journalists, media activists and 
experts suggest that journalistic agents who have yet to earn credibility and reputation exploit 
online communication to its full potential, while agents in the field of power tend to dismiss online 
criticism. The influence of the audience’s media criticism is not solely dependent on the technical 
ability of connecting and hearing the voices of the masses; it has to be in combination with 
symbolic or political capital. However, the demand for media’s social responsibility is also related 
to being more careful and less critical, which is very evident in Israel. Thus, it is important to 
critically reflect on what happens when media accountability practices become more efficient and a 
stronger sense for “being watched” develops. 
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In 2006, the Israeli media critic Dvorit Shargal set up a blog and started to publish 
insider information relating to the journalistic field in Israel – in the beginning 
anonymously. Although she now thinks the impact of her media watch blog is 
limited, she recognizes the potential that the internet offers for a new type of 
media criticism. Shargal does not believe journalists who claim to be unaffected by 
online critique of their work, and states “the crowd can criticize everybody” (l. 
366)1. The question of how online communication affects participation, 
interactivity and transparency in regulatory processes has reached media 
                                                 
1 The interviews conducted for this paper will be cited with the interview partner’s surname and the 
line number in the interview transcripts (e.g. Shargal, l. 366). For the list of interview partners, see 
p. 10. 
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accountability (MA) research. One key project in this respect is the comparative 
survey “Media Accountability and Transparency in Europe” (MediaAcT, 
www.mediaact.eu), which has put a comprehensive exploration of online practices 
related to MA in European and Arab countries on the scientific agenda. This paper 
ties in with this agenda and has two objectives. Firstly, it fills an empirical gap that 
the MediaAcT project has left in the Middle East: the case of Israel. Secondly, this 
paper argues that Bourdieu’s field theory is a useful heuristic tool to analyse MA in 
Israel and related online dynamics. 
 
 
Israel as a test case for media accountability online 
 
Considering the crucial role of media in modern societies, MA scholars raise the 
question of how to hold media accountable without restricting freedom of the 
press. In Israel, there is a particularly high tension between the need for 
independent media that monitors and criticizes political processes, and the 
demand that journalistic agents must not detach themselves from the collective 
interests of society. In 1948, the State of Israel was founded as a parliamentary 
democracy based on a Western model. However, Israel is the only democracy 
legally enforcing a press censorship by the military. Against the background of the 
country’s internal and external conflicts, a lot of importance is attributed to 
journalism in shaping the public opinion (see Peri, 2004; Be’er, l. 266). Besides the 
military censorship and financial strains, Israeli journalism is confronted with an 
increasing “pressure on journalists to conform their activities to what is seen as 
appropriate professional conduct” (Peri, 2012, p. 34). At the same time, Israel has 
a tight and highly developed media market, where online communication has 
become essential for producers and users. 
Israel offers a highly interesting environment in which to pose the question of how 
online communication is used to criticise journalists and their work, and how they 
respond to these claims. However, making Israel a testing ground for MA offers 
valuable insights beyond the national context. The global dynamics which 
journalism is going through “are being accelerated in the Israeli media market 
because it is very small” (Altshuler, l. 79ff). To analyse online dynamics related to 
MA, this paper suggests a theoretical approach that makes it possible to capture 
both historical continuity and change of MA: Bourdieu’s theory of social fields. 
 
 
Theoretical approach: Media as a social field 
 
For Bourdieu, the production of meaning and the need for social distinction are 
central motives driving human beings, and these motives are pursued in different 
social fields. Semi-autonomous fields, e.g. religion, politics, economics or 
journalism, are the product of societal differentiation and are basically small 
worlds governed by their own logic, and their own “rules of the game” (Bourdieu & 
Wacqant, 1996, p. 127). In fact, the game analogy – which Bourdieu himself 
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frequently uses – highlights important assumptions of field theory: that the field’s 
structure and dynamic are shaped by permanent struggles and competition among 
the players, who share a collective belief in the sense of the game, a common illusio 
that it is worth it to play (Bourdieu, 1999, p. 360). In the media field, the illusio is 
the shared sense of playing for participation in the public discourse. It is about 
public attention for the agent’s topics and opinions, whereby power translates into 
communicative representation (Beck, Büser & Schubert, 2013). 
 
Media capital 
 
Fields are characterized by internal conflicts and struggle based on unequally 
allocated resources – capital – amongst the agents. Bourdieu (1983, p. 185) 
distinguishes between three basic forms of capital: economic capital (monetary 
and material property), social capital (social network, available contacts), and 
cultural capital (knowledge, skills, education). Moreover, in every field, a specific 
composition of economic, social and cultural capital is considered relevant and 
legitimate, which in this case is defined as media capital. Three forms of media 
capital can be identified: incorporated, institutionalized, and objectified media 
capital (Beck, Büser & Schubert, 2013, p. 248ff). Drawing on the concept of media 
competence, incorporated media capital describes the ability to use, assess, and 
critically evaluate ethical, political, and professional aspects of media content and 
production (ibid.). Institutionalized media capital refers to formal education (e.g. 
degree from journalism school) or a certain position in the media organization. 
Media ownership, control of the means of production as well as technical access to 
public communication are conceptualised as objectified media capital. Media 
agents such as journalists, individual media users, bloggers or NGOs occupy a 
certain position in the field according to their capital.  
Media capital can unfold symbolic power in the media field (ibid., p. 245f). This so 
called specific symbolic capital becomes the “trump in the game” (Bourdieu, 1985, 
p. 10). In contrast to objective power that is derived from a certain amount of 
capital, symbolic power is based on being recognised by others as such. Symbolic 
power often correlates with prestige and creates the agent’s legitimacy. In 
journalism, symbolic capital is at work when the credibility of well-respected 
media is naturally accepted and the quality of journalistic products is not 
questioned anymore. 
 
Journalism as the field of power 
 
Journalistic agents like individual journalists or collective agents (outlets, 
newsrooms, etc.) usually possess a higher amount of media capital than NGOs or 
the audience. Although located within the media field as a field of power, 
journalism is also subjected to specific rules and follows a distinct logic. It is thus 
defined as a semi-autonomous field within the media field. Journalistic agents 
professionally dedicate themselves to producing public discourse and struggle to 
have their suggested meanings and principles “recognized as legitimate categories 
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MEDIA FIELD 
Specific Symbolic Capital (SSC): prestige, reputation, credibility / legitimation: 
internal / stakes: independence, journalistic quality standards, societal functions 
(criticism, control etc.) 
- Indicators: mixed financing, critical/investigative editorial line, prestige and 
reputation among journalists, journalistic awards 
External capital: economic or political capital / legitimation: external / stakes: wide 
reach and/or external collaboration 
- Indicators: dependence on advertising/political subsidies, commercial or polit-
ical editorial line, wide reach 
Media capital  
- Incorporated: media use and ability to asses media content / distribution of 
own content 
- Institutionalised: formal and professional media education 
- Objectified: material resources or technical access 
of the social world.“ (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 37). In the journalistic field, the 
interpretive authority over public discourse and the monopoly of information are 
at stake. The “product of news” (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 105) or exclusive news in the 
sense of scoops (Meyen, 2009, p. 336) are assumed to be of special relevance in 
journalism, but even more so the perceived legitimacy and credibility as symbolic 
capital. 
 
Figure 1: Media as a Social Field 
 
 
Own representation based on Bourdieu, 1999, p. 203; Meyen, 2009, p. 329; Beck, Büser & 
Schubert, 2013, p. 244/250. 
 
Unlike social systems (Luhmann), fields are never entirely autonomous from 
external forces (Bourdieu & Wacqant, 1996, p. 134). The degree of a field’s 
autonomy varies over time, between fields2, and within a field. Journalism is 
generally considered a weakly autonomous field that is influenced by external 
                                                 
2 For instance, mathematics or poetry are almost completely autonomous fields – they have 
primarily their “peers as their clients” (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 48).  
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commercial and political powers (see Champagne, 2005), as well as by its publics 
in the media field. The position of agents in a field is hierarchically structured 
according to their amount of capital but also according to the composition of 
capital in between a heteronomous and an autonomous pole. At the autonomous 
pole, the specific symbolic capital of the field is at stake, and the field’s specific 
internal logic shapes the agents’ practices and perceptions. Here, agents play for 
independence and journalistic quality standards. Societal functions like the 
informative, monitoring and critical role become a source of distinction and 
symbolic capital. At the heteronomous pole the economic, the political and 
potentially other social fields exert influence on journalism and the capital of those 
fields becomes relevant.  
 
Baisnée and Zombrano (2014) have previously suggested field theory to analyse 
MA. However, their comparative framework does not integrate the audience’s role 
and the impact of online dynamics remains unclear. By defining MA from a 
Bourdieuian perspective and drawing on the concept of a media field in which 
journalists and media users interact (Beck, Büser & Schubert, 2013), this study 
addresses these theoretical shortcomings. 
 
 
Media Accountability: a question of autonomy and influence 
 
Striving for autonomy is a central dynamic of social fields (Benson, 2013, p. 40). 
However, autonomy also implies some kind of isolation and “can lead to an 
‘egoistic’ closing-in on the specific interests of the people engaged in the field” 
(Bourdieu, 2005, p. 45). The more autonomous a field is the greater is the 
“tendency of professionals to look down on laypersons” (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 44), 
and the more agents follow their inherent field interests.  
 
In democracies, the autonomy of journalism is a normative question. A certain 
degree of autonomy from the religious, political and economic field is a (desirable) 
precondition for the ability to criticize those powers, and essential for being a 
mediator of information in society. At the same time, the media are expected to not 
detach themselves from the needs of the society and to provide citizens with 
information that follow certain journalistic standards. MA poses the problem of 
enforcement: Freedom of the press limits political regulation, while the free 
market has proven to be insufficient to guarantee journalistic quality (i.e. 
“commercialisation”). How can processes like isolation, commercialisation and 
political interference be confronted without excessively restricting media 
autonomy? To answer this question scholars have referred to MA instruments 
(MAI) as “any non-state means of making media responsible to the public” 
(Bertrand, 2000, p. 108) or to “processes by which the media answer directly or 
indirectly to their society for the quality and/or consequences of publication” 
(McQuail, 2003, p. 207). This paper suggests defining ways to hold media 
accountable as social practices of agents in the media field, called MA practices.  
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Following the logic of the media field outlined above, MA practices can be 
distinguished according to the location of their initiation. MA practices initiated 
inside the journalistic field are practices that are set up by journalistic agents 
themselves and are widely controlled inside the field (self-imposed ethical codes, 
unions, complaint management). Their implementation depends on the autonomy 
of the field as a whole and on the positions of agents occupied in the field between 
an autonomous and heteronomous pole. 
However, MA cannot be reduced to an attribute of journalistic agents or of the 
journalistic field. Given the tendency towards encapsulation of professional fields, 
MA is just as much a question of efficiency of external claims by media agents, as 
already acknowledged by Plaisance (2000): “The function of accountability, in 
reality, is an issue of influence” (p. 259). The influence of MA practices initiated 
outside the journalistic field (e.g. criticism and monitoring of media) is dependent 
on the agent’s media capital, that is, the possibilities for participation in the public 
discourse based on incorporated, institutionalized, and objectified media capital. 
 
Media accountability mechanisms  
 
This paper interprets the four MA mechanisms (a) politics by regulation and laws, 
(b) market by demand and supply, (c) the public via discussion and dialogue, and 
(d) the profession via self-regulation (Bardoel & d’Haenens, 2004, p. 188) as 
different field logics. According to the conception of the media field the 
mechanisms can be reclassified as internal (c, d) and external (a, b) forces exerting 
influence on journalism. The dominance of one mechanism presumably operates 
against the effects of others. For instance, very strict political restrictions limit the 
scope for action of professional standards or audience critique to a minimum. In 
most liberal democracies, on the other hand, market mechanisms play a major role 
and can constrain autonomous MA mechanisms (Heikkilä et al., 2012, p. 18). For 
Neuberger (2009), online communication fundamentally changes the way public 
communication is regulated. He assumes that internal MA mechanisms (“self-
regulation via a (meta) public sphere”, p. 29) gain in importance in contrast to 
external political, legal, and economic control.  
 
Media accountability online 
 
The technically interactive and decentralised structures of online communication 
have the potential for amplifying participation of different agents in MA practices 
and for countering processes of journalistic insulation. Online communication 
potentially triggers a re-distribution of media capital that could empower the 
audience to enforce their claims towards journalistic agents. Increased meta-
coverage facilitated by a variety of actors (users, journalists, bloggers) makes 
journalism more vulnerable to control and criticism, and thus poses a potential 
threat for the symbolic power in the journalistic field (Russell, 2013, p. 209). A 
redistribution of capital also seems feasible with regard to the different forms of 
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media capital: Costly means of production (objectified media capital) become less 
relevant while media literacy (incorporated media capital) tends to have more 
influence on the positioning of agents in the field. For Bivens (2008), “the growing 
organisation and effectiveness of citizens to influence opinions is enabled by new 
media and amplifies notions of accountability for news organisations” (p. 122). 
However, field theory reminds us that online communication is embedded in 
existing structures and that certain rules of the game might not drastically change. 
For instance, agents who already have accumulated a certain amount of capital are 
probably able to acquire new media skills easier and quicker (Beck, Büsler & 
Schubert, 2013, p. 248). Besides transferring “old” capital to the new 
communication environment, the convertibility of political and economic capital at 
the heteronomous pole endures. Finally, the possibilities for a relative 
empowerment of media users and NGOs to demand media accountability can be 
countered by strategies that are aimed at the retention of power (Plaisance, 2000, 
p. 267). 
This article focuses on potentially new scopes of action for MA practices enabled by 
online communication in contrast to mass media communication, which are 
summarized in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Potential of online communication for media accountability practices (MA 
practices).  
 
Dimension Potential of online 
communication 
MA practices (Examples) 
MA practices initiated in the journalistic field 
Social dimension:  
group of 
participants and 
repertoire of actions 
Interactivity: flexible 
direction of communication: 
roles of communicator and 
receiver changeable  
(a) Responsiveness  
responding to reader’s criticism via 
comment function, online complaint 
function, SNS or e-mail 
Transparency between 
producers and users 
(b) Transparency of actors and of 
production 
profiles of journalists, publication of ethical 
codes and/or ownership, links to external 
sources, media journalism and media watch 
blogs by journalists 
MA practices initiated outside the journalistic field 
Social dimension: 
group of 
participants and 
repertoire of actions 
  
Participation: possibility to 
participate in debates by 
publishing own content  
Interactivity (see above) 
(c) New formats of publication and 
interactivity  
media watchblogs, websites of NGOs, 
criticism via comment function and SNS 
Networking among 
participants 
(d) “Crowd criticism“ and 
aggregation media criticism SNS (also 
groups); online petitions and online 
campaigns  
Time dimension: 
speed, permanence 
of the connection 
Synchronicity, real time, 
simple detention of content 
for users 
(e) Real time criticism 
via SNS, comments, blog entries; 
monitoring in real time 
Space dimension: 
range and flexibility 
Wide range (global) (f) Range of criticism 
via SNS, international media criticism  
 
Own representation drawing on Neuberger, 2009, p. 25; Heikkilä et al., 2012, p. 42, Fengler, 2012, 
p. 184 
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The objectives of MA practices initiated inside the journalistic field can be 
specified by (a) responsiveness and (b) transparency (Heikkilä et al., 2012, p. 42). 
Responsiveness relates to practices where journalistic agents react, respond or 
engage in dialogue with media users. Online communication offers different 
channels that facilitate claims and responses: comment functions on websites, 
social network sites (SNS) like Facebook (FB) and twitter or e-mail. Transparency 
defines the disclosure of and access to information. In the light of an open access 
and (almost) unlimited room for publication online, transparency has been 
increasingly demanded of the political and economic elite3. It is argued that the 
claim for transparency is or should be increasingly transferred to journalists as 
agents in the field of power (Groenhart & Evers, 2014, p. 129; Vos, Craft & Ashley 
2011, p. 11). Related to journalism, transparency can concern agents or the 
production process. Actor transparency can be enhanced by profiles of journalists, 
information about ownership, and the publication of a mission statement or 
professional standards (Evers & Eberwein, 2011, p. 252). Production transparency 
can be implemented by publishing background information on journalistic 
processes or linking to original sources (ibid.).  
 
Online communication provides a series of tools for MA practices initiated outside 
the journalistic field. New forms of publication, e.g. watchblogs, can be used in 
order to raise public attention for problems of journalism and to expose bias or 
mistakes in reporting (c). A field study on media watchblogs suggests that although 
direct influence on journalism might be limited, the exposure of bias and 
inaccuracy in media coverage can improve the media competence of the audience 
(Mayer et al., 2008, p. 591) and thus reduce asymmetry of capital.  
 
The term “crowd criticism” (d) refers to an infinite group of agents who can use a 
“plethora of fast, low-cost options to (if you want, anonymously) ‘voice’ criticism 
and protest – via email, chats, commentary functions, Twitter, Facebook, and the 
like” (Fengler, 2012, p. 184). Here, the possibility of the crowd to connect in order 
to increase pressure is emphasised. The relation of the (time) resources users have 
to invest and the symbolic capital that can be at stake implies a relative 
empowerment of the audience: it might take only a minute to tweet about “a 
journalist’s lapse” but if it spreads, “this might have an impact on the journalist’s 
reputation” (ibid., p. 186). The potentials of synchronicity for real time criticism 
(e), and the potential to increase the range of criticism (f) are supposed to achieve 
effects mainly in combination with (c) and (d). 
 
 
Research questions  
 
By applying Bourdieu’s theory of fields, more specially by defining MA as a 
function of heteronomy/autonomy of the journalistic field on the one hand, and as 
                                                 
3 For instance by open government initiatives, and other civil society agents like Transparency 
International, Wikileaks, or Anonymous. 
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a function of influence of agents in the media field on the other, this article 
suggests a new perspective for analysing MA online. Bennett (2007, p. 226) has 
explicitly called for analysing MA related to national dilemmas in empirical case 
studies instead of relying on pure theoretical explorations. Taking this demand 
into account, the first research question (RQ) of this paper is: 
 
RQ1: How can the media field and media accountability be characterized  
in the context of Israel? 
 
The second goal of this study is to explore the impact of online communication on 
MA in the given context, asking how agents in the media field use online tools for 
MA practices:  
 
RQ2: How are the potentials of online communication for MA practices 
used and assessed by relevant agents in Israel? 
 
For journalistic agents, online communication offers a set of options to easily react 
and respond to criticism (responsiveness) and to make themselves and journalistic 
processes more transparent (actor transparency and production transparency): 
 
RQ2a: How are the potentials of online communication for MA practices 
initiated inside the journalistic field used and assessed by relevant agents 
in Israel? 
 
The second sub question addresses the assumption that online communication 
provides the potential for a relative empowerment of non-journalistic agents in the 
media field. They are given a set of tools to articulate and enforce their claims:  
 
RQ2b: How are the potentials of online communication for MA practices 
initiated outside the journalistic field used and assessed by relevant agents 
in Israel? 
 
 
Methodology 
 
The scholarly interest focuses on the agents in Israel’s media field asking how they 
use and assess MA practices. To approach this new and unmapped field an 
explorative method is chosen that directly targets the research objects: semi-
structured expert interviews with relevant agents in the Israeli media field. The 
sample of interview partners combines a selection of extreme and of typical cases 
(Brosius, Koschel & Haas, 2008, p. 84). The following groups of agents were 
considered to be typical cases, as they are typically engaged in MA processes: 
journalists, representatives of MA institutions within the journalistic field, media 
critics and activists, and academics/media experts (Heikkilä et al., 2012, p. 15). 
Within these typical groups extreme cases were selected (see table 2). 
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Table 2: Sample 
 
Journalists (4) MA institutions 
within 
journalism (1) 
Media critics / 
activists (4) 
Experts / academics 
(2) 
Raphael Ahren, 
Times of Israel  
Dedy Markovich, 
IBA* Ombudsman 
Yisrael Medad, 
Israeli Media Watch 
Dr. Tehilla Shwartz 
Altshuler, MA expert, 
IDI** 
Uri Blau, Haaretz   Shuki Tausig and Oren 
Persico, The Seventh Eye 
Journal 
Ido Liven, freelancer, 
blogger, social media 
expert 
Haggai Matar, 
freelancer, activist, 
blogger 
 Dvorit Shargal, media 
watchblog Velvet 
Underground 
 
Tal Schneider, 
freelancer, activist, 
blogger 
 Yizhar Be’er, Keshev  
*Israel Broadcasting Authority **Israel Democracy Institute 
 
Extreme cases highlight dynamics and indicate potential changes of still 
unexplored fields of research; in this case of how online communication can 
change MA. The criteria for extreme cases were an extraordinary usage of online 
communication (especially affinity to SNS), high engagement in media criticism or 
activism, and special expertise regarding media and MA in Israel. As media 
criticism turned out to be highly politicized, agents from different positions in the 
polarized political spectrum were included. A selection of typical and extreme 
cases, however, does not claim to be representative – neither regarding the Israeli 
media landscape nor the political views. Quotes will be cited with the interview 
partner’s surname and the line number in the interview transcripts (e.g. Ahren, l. 
78). The interviews were conducted between April and December 2013 in Tel Aviv 
and Jerusalem.  
 
The sample’s categorisation required the conception of three interview guidelines: 
for journalists, media critics/activist, and experts/academics. For the 
representative of an internal MA institution, the guideline for journalists was 
slightly adjusted. All guidelines included five sections: (I) Introduction, (II) 
National Context and MA Institutions, (III) MA practices online: Transparency 
and Responsiveness, (IV) MA practices online: External Critique, and (V) 
Conclusion, Summary and Outlook. The specifications of transparency, 
responsiveness, and external media critique for the questions were inspired by the 
MediaAcT survey (Heikkilä et al., 2012). The complete transcripts of the interviews 
were analysed with the software MAXQDA. The interviews were applied to both 
the question of MA practices online (RQ2) and the portrayal of the media field4. 
 
 
                                                 
4 For instance, statements and perception of the interview partners essentially contributed to reveal 
informal influences. Furthermore, explanations of the interviewees were adduced for topics where 
scholarly literature, at least non-Hebrew, was poor, for instance related to the practice of gag 
orders. 
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The media field and media accountability in Israel 
 
The analytical framework to study MA online in Israel consists of four elements: 
(a) the historical development of journalism, (b) a sketch of relevant agents in 
Israel’s online journalism, (c) an outline of external influences and (d) internal MA 
practices applied in Israel. 
 
Historical development and the impact of intractable conflict 
 
When and how has journalism emerged as a field in Israel? Since the Zionist 
movement for the foundation of the state started in the end of the 19th century, 
journalism has played a crucial role for Israel. Journalists themselves, with 
Theodor Herzl leading the way, actively contributed to the foundation process 
(Brenner, 2002, p. 32). Therefore, it is not surprising that from its emergence, 
Israeli journalism has been subjected to the reason of the state. Only in the 1960s, 
especially after the Six-Day war was won in 1967, a professional field of journalism 
has gradually developed out of a political parallelism and often in coexistence with 
it (Peri, 2012, p. 30ff). In the 1990s, the accelerated and radical process of 
economic and political liberalisation was the driving force for journalistic 
professionalism. The journalists’ detachment from political agents increased and 
even escalated to a “disdain for politicians and politics” (ibid., p. 31). However, the 
ongoing conflict with the bordering Arab states, especially the territorial conflict 
with the Palestinians, has been restraining the processes of detachment, political 
de-ideologisation and liberalisation. On the one hand, journalistic agents reflect 
the political polarisation of Israeli society, which is divided over the struggle for a 
collective identity of the state, the settlement policy, and the two-state solution. On 
the other hand, the constant perception of external threats 
 
“(…) undermines the readiness for pluralism, tolerance, and liberalism and amplifies public 
expectations that the media will exhibit more ‘social responsibility’ – be less critical, more 
committed to collective endeavor, and more supportive of the national leadership” (ibid., p. 
22.). 
 
From a Bourdieuian perspective, social change takes place constantly but always 
on the basis of previously established, historical premises embodied in both the 
field’s structure and the disposition of its agents. In this regard, wars and violence 
may pose a threat to physical security but they also create a certain disposition in a 
“society with memories” (Be’er, l. 78ff).  
 
A sketch of the Israeli online journalism: Relevant agents and their 
positions 
 
The position agents occupy in a field shapes their dispositions towards perceiving, 
thinking, sensing, and acting – their habitus (Bourdieu, 1987, p. 101). A field 
suggests a certain amount of room to manoeuvre for the agents who 
simultaneously determine, change or reproduce the field’s logic and structure 
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(ibid., 1999, p. 361). A sketch of Israel’s dominant agents and their relations is thus 
considered crucial for understanding the media field. The arrangement of the field 
(figure 2) draws on information about ownership, financing, editorial line, and 
range/ranking of Israeli news media in Hebrew. The ranking is based on the 
overview on Israeli online journalism by Caspi (2011), the survey by Teleseker 
Internet Monitor (TIM, table 3), the range of the national newspaper (table 4), and 
observations of the interviewees about dominant agents and their relations.  
The sketch of the journalistic field of power, comprised of the dominant Hebrew 
news media, shows that agents at the heteronomous pole dominate Israeli online 
journalism. Political and commercial forces - that have to be differentiated from 
each other - shape the heteronomous pole. The commercial logic seems even more 
striking considering the dominance of the web portal Walla! (walla.co.il) and the 
websites of the private broadcasting stations (Channel 2/Mako, Channel 
10/nana). The following paragraphs highlight central arguments for the 
arrangement. 
 
Figure 2: The field of power in Israel’s online journalism – agents and positions 
 
 
*not part of the TIM online-ranking 
 
Table 3: Ranking of online media outlets (TIM, 2012); Table 4: Range of newspapers 
in Israel 2013 (TGI, 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Walla! 
2 Ynet/ Yedioth-Gruppe 
3 Channel 2/Mako  
4 Channel 10/nana 
5 NRG/Maariv 
6 Haaretz 
7 Channel1/IBA 
National 
Newspapers  
Percentage of 
Exposure 2013 
(Weekdays) 
Israel Hayom 38.6 % 
Yedioth Ahronot 38.4 % 
Haaretz 6.1 % 
Maariv 3.5 % 
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Heteronomous pole 
 
The web portal Walla! occupies the highest position because of its dominance 
among all websites, and is closest to the heteronomous pole due to a commercial 
orientation including internet services like e-mail.5 Mako (mako.co.il), which is the 
website of the private broadcasting Channel 2 and Ynet6 (ynetnews.com), the 
online offshoot of the newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth (Yedioth), are two “main 
players” (l. 185) in the field: “because of high rating and a lot of influence on Israeli 
content market” (ibid.). The observation of Ynet and Mako being direct 
competitors illustrates their struggle for the same position in the field: “[T]hey are 
huge enemies. They fight like cats.” (ibid., l. 188). Also the journalist Matar sees 
Ynet as “the biggest, strongest, most powerful news website in Israel” (l. 85), and 
Caspi (2011, p. 352) ascribes Ynet a hegemonic position as online news provider 
that attracts readers with consumer-oriented multimedia content. For a long time, 
Yedioth has been regarded as “the state’s newspaper” (Gilboa, 2008, p. 68). 
However, it has increasingly developed a commercial and partly government-
critical line, (ibid.) which has become even more apparent online, in Ynet. Ynet is 
placed closer to the autonomous pole than Mako because it is assumed that Ynet 
has obtained symbolic capital from the print paper Yedioth7. Channel 10/nana is 
seen as critical towards the government and since 2008, has ongoing severe 
financial problems (Liven, l. 59ff). Therefore, it occupies a rather low position and 
slightly shifted to the autonomous pole. 
 
Maariv, which had been one of the most read newspapers in Israel (Gilboa, 2008, 
p. 90), and its online offshoot NRG occupy the lowest position at the 
heteronomous pole. In 2012, the financial crisis of Maariv/NRG led to a wave of 
firings and public protests (Grunzweig & Weisberg, 2012). It is assumed that the 
following series of owner changes also contributed to a loss of symbolic capital. 
First, Nochi Dankner’s IDB group became Maariv/NRG’s main shareholder who 
according to Tausig “bought Maariv to fight Haaretz” (Tausig & Persico, l. 571f), 
which is Israel’s left-liberal newspaper. Subsequently, Maariv was sold to Schlomo 
Ben-Zvi, publisher of the right-religious newspaper Markor Rishon. In 2014, the 
US-American millionaire and Netanjahu-sympathizer Sheldon Adelson acquired 
both the news website NRG and Markor Rishon8. The case of Maariv/NRG 
represents more than simply a financial struggle. It highlights how the loss of 
economic capital makes journalistic agents completely vulnerable to external 
political influences and how political agents fight for the control over public 
discourse in the media field. 
The engagement of Sheldon Adelson in the Israeli media field is noteworthy. He 
finances the free tabloid newspaper Israel Hayom (israelyahom.com) that has 
become the most read newspaper in Israel (table 4). While the external influences 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that in contrast to most other web portals, for instance the German msn, 
Walla! has a stronger focus on reporting and has an own content production. 
6 Ynet has an independent editorial department. 
7 Despite its tabloid character, Yedioth also employs renowned journalists, like Nahum Barnea. 
8 The publisher of Jerusalem Post, Eli Azur, bought the print product Maariv.  
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on Yedioth/Ynet are seen as a net of commercial and political interests, the 
aggregation of interests of the government and Israel Hayom is mainly political 
(Tausig & Persico, l. 508ff). It can also be assumed that Israel Hayom filled a void 
at the heteronomous-political pole that was left by the increasing commercial 
orientation of Yedioth/Ynet. This illustrates that although commercial and political 
powers are closely intertwined, they follow distinct field logics. 
 
Autonomous pole 
 
Only two agents of the journalistic field of power are located at the weaker 
autonomous pole: Haaretz including its Hebrew and English online version 
(haaretz.co.il/com) and the Israel Public Broadcasting Authority (IBA, 
iba.org.il/bet). Despite its financial struggle9, it is argued that Haaretz still keeps a 
relatively high position at the autonomous pole. Haaretz is the only agent in the 
journalistic field of power with a mixed finance model for its online content 
(advertising and subscription). With the slogan “newspaper for thinking people” 
(Gilboa, 2008, p. 90) Haaretz tries to appeal to an elite audience and is staking 
symbolic capital in order to distinguish itself from the heteronomous pole as a 
journalistic agent with national and international prestige. 
 
The special role of Haaretz at the autonomous pole is further validated by a 
vehement detachment from political collaboration, a primary example being its 
refusal to take part in the meetings of the Editor’s committee, the union of media 
outlets that collaborates with the Israeli military censor (see Benn, 2013). During 
the second intifada, Haaretz was criticised harshly by both the audience and 
politicians for publishing information that was considered sensitive or too critical 
of the authorities. The critical line in times of crisis translated into a loss in sales 
and economic capital for Haaretz (Peri, 2004, p. 99). This can be interpreted as a 
rejection of the commercial logic and political antagonism at the autonomous pole. 
However, while some see Haaretz as a vital asset to Israel’s democracy, the severe 
criticism of being an “enemy of the state” or even “anti-semitic” (e.g. Muravchik, 
2013, p. 31), especially in conservative circles, also deprives Haaretz of symbolic 
media capital.  
As a publicly financed institution, symbolic capital is the central source of 
legitimation for the IBA. According to Limor & Gabel (2002, p. 149), the IBA has 
tried to prove its autonomy from the political field without success. Be’er describes 
it as an outdated “dead body” (l. 243) that is “deeply influenced by politicians” (l. 
247) and that has lost its once dominant position with a share of 80 to around 8.6 
percent today. In 2014, the communications minister announced the plan for 
completely replacing the current organisation of the IBA (Tucker & Teig, 2014).  
 
                                                 
9 In 2006, 25 percent of Haaretz were sold to German publisher DuMont Schauberg due to 
financial problems. In 2010, for the same reason, the Haaretz-group sold Walla! to the leading 
telecommunications group Bezeq. 
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The influence of external fields: politics, military and market 
 
With a focus on dynamics related to online communication, the next paragraphs 
will outline the formal (laws, institutions) as well as the informal impact on Israeli 
journalism by politics, the military, and the market. There are concrete indicators 
for also analysing the informal influence of an external field: agents moving from 
one field to another, commonalities of the agents’ social origin (e.g. education), the 
gap between the agents’ “reciprocal perception of each other”, and the agents’ 
perceived autonomy (Bourdieu, 1999, p. 349). 
 
Politics 
 
Israel does not have a formal constitution.10 Instead, there are several decisions of 
the Supreme Court forming the legal basis for press freedom, which is assumed to 
be generally respected in Israel (Nossek & Limor, 2001, p. 1; Freedom House, 
2013). Based on literature and the interviews conducted for this paper, licensing11, 
military censorship, the libel laws and gag orders are relevant regulations related 
to press freedom.  
The military censorship is based on the “Defence (Emergency) Regulation” that 
was already enacted during the British Mandate in Palestine and adopted into 
Israeli legislation (Nossek & Limor, 2001, p. 16). The authority of the chief military 
censor, currently Sima Vaknin-Gil, is anchored in law. Although the legislation 
requires that any publication – books, newspapers or articles for websites – must 
be submitted to the military censor prior to publication, the procedure is in 
practice based on a mutual agreement between the media, the military and 
governmental authorities. Hence, only publications that deal with security-related 
issues listed in a catalogue are handed to the military censor for examination 
(ibid.). 
Gag orders, instead, can be applied to prohibit reporting on a variety of topics. 
“Gags” are typically applied to restrict reporting on criminal investigations or 
scandals that involve Israeli authorities. Tausig from the Seventh Eye Journal (7th 
Eye) criticises the gag order procedures as opaque and arbitrary:  
 
“You go to the judge, and you say: ‘I need this, stop the protocols, I will show you some 
secret information‘. And the judges, most of the time, give the gag; and there is no one on 
the other side“ (Tausig & Persico, l. 848ff). 
 
Gag orders seem to be applied to compensate for a relatively liberal military 
                                                 
10 According to the Supreme Court, the assembly of “Basic Laws” should resemble a normative force 
similar to a constitution (Peled, 2012, p. 741). However, there is no legal basis for freedom of the 
press comparable to Article 5 of Germany’s Basic Law or the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  
11 Licensing in the telecommunications sector is no longer conducted by the state but by the now 
private company Bezeq since 1982 (Ministry of Communication, 2006). By law, publishers of print 
products are also required to have a license. The authority for print licensing rests with the Ministry 
of the Interior which is also authorised to shut down media organisations. However, in practice 
neither plays much of a role (Liven, l. 338; Freedomhouse, 2013). 
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censorship (Tausig & Persico, l. 824ff/834f; Altshuler, l. 276ff). The fact that the 
censor usually follows the liberal interpretations of the Supreme Court12, and that 
the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) increasingly draws on gag orders, has even led to 
the thesis of the Israeli military censor being a guardian of freedom of the press 
(Nossek & Limor, 2011, p. 124). Besides the informal procedure and a broader area 
of application, it might contribute to the extensive use of gag orders that they also 
ban citation, for example, links to blogs or foreign sources13 (Altshuler, l. 300). 
However, the effectiveness of gag orders is also limited, at least ultimately, since 
online information easily spreads (ibid., l. 307). Online content is systematically 
monitored by the military censor (Krupsky, 2012). However, chief censor Vaknin-
Gil states that the monitoring focuses on agents with symbolic capital: “Obviously 
an article by a correspondent who has good connections with senior sources is not 
the same as something published somewhere by the man in the street” (Vaknin-Gil 
cited in Blau, 2008).  
In 2011, the attempts of the Netanyahu-government to tighten libel law14 (higher 
fees, lower barriers for the claimers; Bicom, 2011) were followed by a lot of 
criticism that this would damage freedom of expression (Kesveh, 2012; Liven, l. 
232; Schneider, l. 283). The far-reaching encroachment of the mentioned political 
MA mechanisms is the reason for journalist Tal Schneider to state that it is not a 
question of media accountability but of autonomy that should be posed in Israel (l. 
281ff). 
However, the picture of a journalistic field that is restricted and dominated by 
politics is not adequate or, at least, incomplete. Several observations point to the 
influence of journalism on the political field, for instance, the journalists’ 
perception that media has a decisive impact on politics and politicians (Meyer & 
Cohen, 2011, p. 15). Compared to other countries, Israeli journalists see themselves 
less as objective observers but rather as “agenda setters” (Hanitzsch et al., 2011, p. 
282). Altshuler implies that as a consequence of the high level of politicisation of 
the society as a whole, and the parallel need to detach themselves, journalists 
complained that they were becoming “cynical” and even “too sceptical” (l. 64ff). 
Besides the engagement of political agents in the media field, which is most 
obvious in the sponsoring of Israel Hayom by Sheldon Adelson, it is worth 
mentioning that journalists also move into politics. Former journalist Yair Lapid 
rose quickly to political prominence as minister of finance, the journalist Shelly 
Yachimovich became leader of the Israeli Labor Party.  
 
Media critics (Medad; Tausig & Persico) stress that Israeli journalism is a very 
insular field. Thus, for Peri (2004), it is even the political autonomy that is 
threatened by media influence and not the other way around. To describe the 
                                                 
12 An important decision of the Supreme Court (no. 680/88) was made already in 1989: It limits the 
censorship to topics that excessively put security in danger with a high probability (Nossek & 
Limor, 2011, S. 119; also Tausig & Persico, l. 824-826; Altshuler, l. 278). 
13 The phrase “according to foreign sources” that is commonly used when a censored topic is 
published in foreign news media cannot be applied when a gag order is imposed on the issue. 
14 Libel law is anchored in criminal law and is based on the “Defamation Act” of 1992 (see Peled, 
2012). 
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Israeli “mediapolitik” he explicitly refers to field theory: “To borrow from 
Bourdieu, the mere intrusion of the journalistic field into the political arena is the 
problem” (ibid., p. 5). The relationship between politics and journalism is shaped 
by a tension between antagonism and mutual influence. This tension can be 
ascribed to two field dynamics: Firstly, to the detachment of journalists from the 
political field as social distinction and accumulation of symbolic capital, and, 
secondly, to the consensual collaboration of political and journalistic agents in the 
common struggle for interpretive authority in the media field. 
 
Military 
 
This study argues that it is necessary to distinguish political and military influence 
on Israeli journalism, since the military has never played a purely functional role 
for the country. Maman et al. (2001, p. 109) describe the security ethos as “a meta-
value” that is a constitutive element of the Israeli society. Peri (2007) claims that 
the status of the military as a “sacred cow” (p. 79) has only vanished superficially. 
Therefore, the media only raises instrumental but no fundamental criticism of the 
Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) (ibid.).  
 
The military influence on journalism begins in education. A significant number of 
journalists spend their military service (36 months for male, 21 for female Israelis) 
within the army radio station Galei Zahal, which is said to be Israel’s biggest 
journalism school (ibid., p. 88). This leads to a high degree of conformity in the 
journalistic field, a fact that Medad, member of the executive board of “Israel's 
Media Watch” (IMW), criticises as one of the main problems of Israeli Journalism: 
“Coming out of the same school, school of journalism in a very broad sense” (l. 
126ff) leads to a constant reproduction of mistakes and interpretative models that 
shape editorial styles and views. Another particular characteristic that strengthens 
media-military ties is the obligation of military correspondents to be accredited by 
the IDF, which often leaves the IDF with the information monopoly concerning 
military operations (Peri, 2007, p. 79). The close ties between the fields elucidate 
the nature of the military censorship in Israel: reporting is not censored in an 
authoritative or repressive manner but rather on the basis of collaborative self-
censorship. As journalist and activist Matar claims, “the vast majority that isn’t 
being told isn’t being told for self-censorship” (l. 293)15.  
The IDF has a symbolic power that exerts its influence on all fields of the Israeli 
society. The relationship between journalism and the military is – much more than 
with the political field – based on collaboration. This means that journalism loses 
autonomy but not for nothing. As collaborators of the military, journalistic agents 
become a “special class of citizens with a special stake in the state’s success” 
(Christians & Cooper, 2009, p. 207), and guardians of information who ultimately 
contribute to the state’s security.  
                                                 
15 Matar (l. 296) criticises that journalists write in a conformist and self-censored manner not only 
about military issues but also about the Arab world, specifically about the Palestinian Territories, 
and the Israeli occupation. 
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Economy 
 
Related to the question of responsibility and the general problems of Israeli 
journalism, the interviewees highlighted financial pressure and the influence of the 
economy (Shargal, l. 113ff; Matar, l. 50ff; Altshuler, l. 91; Be’er, l. 208ff): “Even in a 
society in crisis like in Israel, I think ideology influences the media even less than 
economy” (ibid.). This is not surprising against the background of the financial 
crisis including massive firings, and frequent change of ownership. According to 
Altshuler, several phenomena contribute to the economic trouble of Israel’s media. 
The traditional business models of journalism are failing online. Simultaneously, 
media outlets are suffering from the migration of advertising budgets to the 
internet.16 In Israel, the internet’s central economic merit, which is the possibility 
to open up to new and different markets, is limited due to the narrow boundaries 
of the country, geographically and in terms of language. The success of the free 
newspaper Israel Hayom is another factor that has aggravated the financial 
problems of Israel’s media: 
 
“The fact that a major competitor who doesn't need to proof any business model but is 
rather being kept by a foreign millionaire or billionaire is something that gets the system as 
a whole out of its equilibrium“ (Altshuler, l. 102ff).  
 
With Israel Hayom entering the journalistic arena it becomes evident how a strong 
player can change the whole economic and symbolic power arrangements within a 
field (see also Tausig & Persico, l. 582; Be’er, l. 256ff).  
 
Internal MA mechanisms: Self-regulation and the role of the audience 
 
Ideally, internal MA mechanisms prevent external influence and counterbalance 
dependence on the political and economic field (Bardoel & d’Haenens, 2004, p. 
173). The following autonomous MA practices were identified in Israel: the Israeli 
Press Council, ethical codes17, ombudspersons, and media journalism. The often-
described problems of journalistic self-regulation practices, the lack of publicity 
and a lack of awareness even among journalists, also apply to Israel. This concerns 
especially the institution of ombudspersons that was appreciated by the 
interviewees but of low prominence (Liven, l. 71; Blau, l. 90; Medad, l. 181). 
Internal MA practices seem to be more prominent at the autonomous pole. 
Haaretz and the IBA are the only journalistic agents located at the autonomous 
pole and the only institutions with an ombudsperson or public editor. The 
evaluation of journalistic MA mechanisms by media expert Altshuler implies that 
indeed MA practices can serve as a source for symbolic capital: “If you have any 
kind of organisational accountability culture such as Haaretz is very proud of or 
                                                 
16 The comparison of advertising budgets according to media types shows that the printed press’ 
share decreased from 50 percent in 2004 to 31 percent in 2010. In the same timeframe, the share of 
the online sector increased from three to 16 percent (Caspi, 2011, p. 343). 
17 For a detailed overview of the so called “Nakdi Guide” and its different versions see Limor & 
Gabel, 2002. 
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the Public Television [IBA] is very proud of, then you can be lucky. Otherwise they 
do whatever they want” (l. 207ff). The ignorance of the Press Council by the strong 
players Ynet and Channel2/Mako at the dominant heteronomous pole is a practice 
that influences the whole field, states Altshuler (l. 207). Field theory makes this 
claim plausible, as dominant agents can have a definatory power that shapes the 
understanding in a field of what is legitimate and what not (Rudeloff, 2013, p. 144).  
 
More than 70 percent of the Israeli society have access to the internet, and the 
broadband connection in Israel is at EU or US level (Internetworldstats, 2012). 
The high relevance of online news for users in a “highly wired society” 
(Manosevitch, 2011, p. 423; OpenNet Initiative, 2009) is in line with the high 
degree of the online journalism’s institutionalisation (see Caspi, 2011). National, 
Hebrew online media plays a leading role in the Israelis’ internet use (Dror & 
Gershon, 2012, p. 4), which corresponds with the journalistic field of power. 
Related to user generated content, Israeli blogs play a minor role compared to 
other countries while the intensive use of the comment section is even seen as 
characteristic for Israel (Caspi, 2011, p. 353). About 20 percent of all internet users 
claim to be active “talkbackistim”, that is to talk back, i.e. to write online comments 
(Manosevitch, 2011, p. 430). More than 50 percent of internet users use facebook 
(FB) as the most popular SNS (ibid). Accordingly, Schneider acknowledges that FB 
is relevant “to talk to the public” while twitter is the “cosmos of journalists”, and 
relevant if one wishes to “discuss with elite players” (l. 107ff).  
 
The results of the MediaAcT survey suggest that the degree of trust in media or 
media legitimacy is an important indicator of the users’ perceived need to engage 
in MA practices18. In Israel, trust in the media has two remarkable characteristics. 
First, it is rather surprising that Arab Israeli’s have slightly more trust in the media 
than the Jewish population (table 5) because the “Israeli mainstream media 
generally represent the majority (the Jewish population)” and there is “a blatant 
inequality as the media do not represent the need of Israeli Arabs, who see 
themselves as a minority“ (Katz, 2007, p. 390). As most Arabs in Israel use 
Palestinian and foreign Arab media (ibid.), it remains unclear to which media the 
Arab’s trust refers. 
 
Secondly, trust in media is notably higher among Israelis who are considered to 
belong to the “moderate left” in the political spectrum (table 5). Given that trust in 
the media is shaped by the media agents’ position in the political spectrum it does 
not come as a surprise that all interviewees mentioned without being prompted 
that the audience’s feedback is politically motivated.19 Many times, journalists or 
articles are claimed to be “too leftist” and “too rightist” at the same time (e.g. 
Shargal, l. 251). Besides the political principle of vision and division “left/right”, 
                                                 
18 The MediaAcT survey suggests: “attempts to establish practices to hold the news media 
accountable are most numerous in countries where the lack of media legitimacy seems most 
articulate” (Heikkilä et al., 2012, p. 70). 
19 See Ahren, l. 287; Altshuler, l. 248f; Blau, l. 66f; Schneider, l. 66f; Shargal, l. 251ff; Tausig & 
Persico, l. 377f; Liven, l. 207f. 
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the partly related dichotomy “for/against Israel” becomes relevant when the 
audience measures journalistic quality. Especially when it comes to journalistic 
behaviour which is perceived to stand in opposition of the collective interests of the 
country: “(…) then what is most important is not whether the media, or the 
government in its relation to the media, acted properly or transparently, or 
ethically – but whether or not you are hitting on Israel or not“ (Medad, l. 500ff). 
 
Table 5: To what extent do you trust each of the following individuals or institutions? 
 
Trust in institutions and  
public figures to a large  
extent or to some extend* 
Jews Arabs 
IDF 90.9 34.9 
President of Israel 78.7 41.7 
Supreme Court 62.7 49.7 
Police 61.9 43.5 
Government 57.9 33.3 
Knesset 54.5 38.5 
Prime Minister 51.7 31.0 
Media  47.2 48.1 
Chief Rabbinate/Religious leaders 43.0 43.3 
Political Parties 36.7 43.2 
*percentagewise. Source: Israeli Democracy Index 2013 in Hermann, 2012, p. 42. 
 
The political frame of media criticism bears the risk of increasing withdrawal and a 
“bunker mentality” (Domingo, 2011, p. 11), which is confirmed by the experience of 
Medad (IMW):  
 
“More than the half we are getting from media people is: if I get criticized from the right, 
and I get criticized from the left, I must be doing something correct (…). The possibility that 
the left is right, and the right is right, and 'perhaps we are all wrong', this they would never 
say. They are not accountable because they push it off” (l. 268ff). 
 
Also Tausig (7th Eye) criticises mixing up field logics: “Politically motivated 
journalism is corrupting journalism, and politically motivated criticism of the 
journalism is corrupting criticism” (Tausig & Persico, l. 388). Persico, instead, 
insists on the value of all kinds of criticism:  
 
“When I write about a newspaper ignoring what is happening in the West Bank: They are 
maybe politically motivated or commercially motivated not to write about that. I am maybe 
politically motivated when I criticize them but it is also a professional problem when they 
decide to ignore something like that. When someone says: ‘the article you printed you got 
the story from someone who hates Israel‘. So what? If it is true, if it is a fact, if critique has 
value by itself than it doesn't matter if the motivation in the beginning was politically 
motivated or not” (ibid., l. 407ff). 
 
In the Israeli media field, a range of collective agents were identified who have 
dedicated themselves to monitoring, criticising, researching and influencing 
journalism (table 6). 
 
Political  
orientation  
Trust in the 
media to a 
large extent or 
to some extend  
Right 35.0 
Moderate right 37.0 
Center 56.0 
Moderate left 70.4 
Left 63.7 
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Table 6: Collective MA agents in the Israeli media field 
 
NGO (URL) Political alignment  
Israel Democracy Institut (IDI) (en.idi.org.il) 
The Seventh Eye Journal (7th Eye) 
(the7eye.org.il) 
liberal think-tank 
media journal published and financed by the IDI  
Keshev (keshev.org.il) Left-liberal mediawatch organisation 
Israel’s Media Watch (imw.org.il) Right-conservative mediawatch organisation 
Presspectiva (presspectiva.org.il) Conservative mediawatch organisation 
Tadmit (tadmit.org.il) National-religious mediawatch organisation 
I‘lam (ilam-center.org) Palestinian, leftwing mediawatch organisation  
 
Accountability practices initiated in the journalistic field 
 
In the following section the interviewees’ perception and their application of 
transparency and responsiveness in online journalism are interpreted on three 
levels that field theory suggests: (a) national field, (b) journalistic field, and (c) 
positions within the field.  
 
National field 
 
“[T]he Israeli public definitely cherishes secrecy“, explains Liven (l. 101f). In Israel, 
the notion of transparency is generally rather problematic. For Altshuler (l. 317ff) 
the preference for loyalty to the community and for secrecy over the disclosure of 
information is connected to the Jewish history. Whistleblowing has been “always 
used or referred to someone who would be talking about Jews to the Gentiles” (l. 
315f). Persico, instead, thinks that a certain legitimacy of secrecy has to do with the 
“sense of a military state, and that you’re living in a bunker surrounded by 
enemies” (l. 708f). The societal preference for secrecy may explain why a 
transparency and open government movement is just in the early stages in Israel 
(Altshuler, l. 358ff). The demand for journalists to be transparent is a new idea for 
most interviewees (e.g. Liven, l. 99; Matar, l. 222ff). Thus, it is not surprising that 
the interviewees do not agree with the assumption that civil society’s demand for 
transparency from the political power field is applied to journalism (e.g. Liven, l. 
99f; Matar, l. 22ff). While the idea of production transparency in journalism is 
generally appreciated, the demand for journalists to be transparent about 
themselves also provokes concerns (ibid.).  
 
Since Haggai Matar has a background in both journalism and political activism, he 
is aware that actor transparency has a negative aspect, which might especially 
show up in the national context: “many people in Israel would not read things I 
write about the violation of worker rights in the municipality because I support the 
end of the occupation” (l. 246f). Actor transparency could aggravate a tendency to 
only read those journalists who share the reader’s world view, a process of “niche-
in” that makes inter-society communication harder in an already polarized society 
(ibid, l. 139f). The more transparent and well-known the journalist’s background 
is, the more the content might be (only) assessed according to a person’s view on 
the Arabic-Israeli conflict. The political affiliation of media criticism is also a 
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challenge for the media’s responsiveness. Interviewees claimed to never respond to 
criticism in the comments section or on SNS because it was “ideologically rigid” 
(Ahren, l. 287) and mainly directed at the person or institution rather than media 
content (Blau, L. 67f). This manifests especially with Haaretz, where comments 
first of all criticise “this institution Haaretz, and its approach, and its legacy rather 
than the facts being right or wrong” (ibid.). Shargal, media critic and former 
journalist, observes that:  
 
“Haaretz is the most leftist newspaper and most of the commenters are people from the 
right. Because, you know, the people say the media is leftist (…) All the people from the 
right they feel they have no other way to have their voice published” (l. 263ff). 
 
These observations are in line with the idea that it is about access to public 
discourse in the media field and that online communication provides new channels 
for that. However, it is conceivable that actors react to the flood of comments by 
walling-off themselves and rather with increased control mechanisms instead of 
responsiveness. On Haaretz online, for instance, only 50 percent of the comments 
are published at all, claims its editor in chief (Friedmann, 2011, p. 8).  
 
Journalistic field 
 
Altshuler attributes (l. 372ff) the rejection of transparency in journalism to a 
general phenomenon that is characteristic of fields with a public mission and a 
normative claim for autonomy that “forbids them [from] being transparent” 
(ibid.). The common feature of institutions like the media, universities or courts is 
that they demand transparency from others but claim the right to secrecy for 
themselves (ibid., l. 380). Medad’s criticism of journalists for not engaging in 
accountability points to their monitoring role: “they [journalists] say we are off, 
you can't do this because we are the critics of society, so we have to remain 
outside” (l. 150f). Also according to Matar “the old notion of journalists that should 
be objective, cold, and detached, and just like a name under the story, not actual 
individuals” (l. 222ff) prevails and therefore, journalist are not even expected by 
the audience to be “upfront about their own interests and believes” (ibid.). Medad 
questions the translation of the online potential for transparency into practice 
because the field was “very insular” (l. 283):  
 
“The media claims they don't want interference. Don't come into our field. (…). That is an 
aspect of the media in terms of what is digital or not of protecting itself and not open up 
despite the fact that digitalization could technically open up” (l. 283ff.) 
 
Tal Schneider disagrees with a demand for transparency in journalism, 
distinguishing herself from elected representatives: “I don’t like the way people put 
journalists at the same level as politicians. It is not the same: I was not elected, and 
I never pretended to represent anybody. It is mixed up” (l. 233f). Blau, instead, 
concludes that the journalist’s decision of being a public person creates a certain 
need for transparency and public scrutiny (l. 116ff).  
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Positions in the field 
 
According to Persico, transparency and responsiveness are less a question of 
“online or offline” but rather a question of the organization’s “culture” or “pulse” (l. 
358) – and thus its position. Almost all collective actors in the journalistic field of 
power have an integrated comment area and contact form on their websites, and 
have a FB profile (see also Manosevitch, 2011, p. 434ff). Yet only on the website of 
Haaretz, authors have a profile with a photo and a short biography; and can be 
approached directly via e-mail by the audience. Israel Hayom, in contrast, is the 
only website without feedback possibilities for the readers on the website’s articles. 
This is in line with Altshuler’s claim of a stronger MA culture at the autonomous 
pole, which may also apply to online practices. External links, which can enhance 
production transparency, lead the audience to other sites while internal links 
contribute to search engine optimization. Following this logic, media must be able 
to forgo clicks and views in order to validate articles with foreign sources: “because 
we are not commercial we don't care if they [the readers] leave to another site” (l. 
164ff), claims Tausig.  
Two cases clearly illustrate that if agents strive for symbolic capital, online 
communication can foster responsiveness and transparency if agents strive after 
symbolic capital. The first describes accumulation of symbolic capital at the 
autonomous pole. The ombudsman of the public broadcasting channel IBA, Dedy 
Markovich, started to use SNS to discuss audience’s complaints and ethical 
questions relating to media. The IBA homepage directly links to his profile on FB. 
In contrast to an e-mail or letter, online comments or tweets are not considered 
official complaints. However, Markovich initiates and moderates discussions on 
twitter and FB that are in the aftermath dealt with by the institutionalised 
committee in the aftermath: “after I talked about it [the marriage of an IBA 
journalist with a high ranked politician] in the web, the ethics committee of the 
IBA decided to discuss it. And the ethical board, it has the power to decide” (l. 
156ff). Markovich also appreciates that the public begins to understand what his 
job is about, and suggests these actions should contribute to the symbolic capital of 
the IBA: “I am doing it for the IBA, for the organization, and for the credibility and 
transparency and all other kinds of things public broadcasting has to be or to do” 
(l. 243ff). 
The second example describes the accumulation of capital outside the journalistic 
field of power. After the blogger and journalist Tal Schneider lost her job at the 
newspaper Maariv, she started to use her blog and SNS to push herself “back to 
the stage” (l. 84). She claims to use everything she can to make herself and her 
work more transparent (l. 271), and to respond to every comment (l. 123ff). In 
contrast to all other interviewees, she perceives the comments to be “usually well 
put” (l. 112) and “very eloquent” (ibid.), although criticism is not be “purely 
professional” but comes “with a mission” (l. 60). For Schneider, the crowd is a fast 
and corrective force: “The public is really fast with catching, that if you lie, or if you 
are unreliable, or if you are shallow – you get a really quick public response. Really 
quick” (l. 74f). Responsiveness and transparency are the stakes in a serious 
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struggle for credibility:  
“I think reporters and bloggers, all they have is their reputation for being honest and 
credible and they can lose it ‘like that’. (…). Everything I do, being transparent putting 
myself out there or telling you about myself, I do it for the purpose of my readers to believe 
me that I am honest. (…) This it what drives me, it serves this purpose, it is not a game for 
me” (l. 259) 
 
Also for Matar, production transparency is a matter of symbolic power: 
 
“(…) this [links to external sources] is where blogs and proper mainstream media really 
differ. Bloggers make immense effort to do that because they don’t have the prestige of 
being inside the media establishment, whereas the media establishments kind of enjoy 
their own prestige for just having a name and not have to link to sources. And also the 
independent journalists have the time, and the will” (l. 259ff). 
 
Although the two case examples (Schneider, Markovich) might be rather 
exceptional, they illustrate how the technical potential of online communication 
can be put into practice to enhance responsiveness and transparency – and finally 
foster MA. In contrast to these cases of agents at the autonomous pole, who 
possess a relatively low position in the journalistic field, agents in the field of 
power clamed up even more in the light of a more open communication 
environment: 
 
“(…) because the atmosphere is open and mistakes are more easily discovered they are 
closing their gates even more. They are not giving interviews, they are not showing their 
faces, they don't respond to articles about them. It is like they are in a bunker. So it goes in 
an opposite direction to the general atmosphere. You can see it in politics also. Sharon 
started with it, and now Netanyahu who has his own paper. So you can see it in politics, in 
media, in every field: the feedback from the people in power to the new media age is 
eliminating themselves from the public” (Tausig & Persico, l. 307ff). 
 
Accountability practices initiated outside the journalistic field 
 
Based on the interviews, case examples of MA practices initiated outside the 
journalistic field were selected and matched with the identified technical 
potentials. The objective of the next paragraphs is to highlight how those online 
MA practices can work or fail in practice. This article only ‘phenomenologically’ 
analyses the influence of MA practices on journalism, by interpreting the 
interviewees’ perception and their observed reactions by agents in the field using 
four case studies. 
 
New forms of publication: The media watch blog “Velvet 
Underground” 
 
In 2006, the media watch blog “Velvet Underground”20 rose to prominence after 
the then anonymous blogger published the salaries of journalists working for 
newspapers like Maariv or Yedioth (Carmel, 2006). The film and media critic 
                                                 
20 Hebrew: טוולו דנוארגרדנא  
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Dvorit Shargal, who now writes her blog full time and under her real name, set up 
the blog in “an instant rage, a frustration” (l. 5) because she had “hit the glass 
ceiling” in her journalistic career and because criticism is “one of the main 
characteristics” of her personality (l. 15). Thus, her watch blog was born out of a 
certain position in the field in combination with her critical habitus, and online she 
found the right form of publication in this context online: “it's impossible to write 
it [the criticism] in the printed media. Nobody would let me” (l. 386f). There are 
different opinions on the blog’s impact. For Tal Schneider, Shargal’s blog is “more 
effective” (l. 355) than any other MA practices in Israel. Persico appreciates the 
possibility for users to anonymously comment in her blog without regulation, and 
states that “some stories started there” (Tausig & Persico, l. 675). Shargal 
frequently publishes the audience’s feedback in her blog posts: “[P]eople like it 
because they want to be in the penthouse, not in the cellar” (l. 485ff). Shargal 
herself is modest about the influence of her blog that would only show up “in single 
cases. Because I understand that there are economic situations; that people have to 
earn money” (l. 401ff).  
 
Crowd Criticism: empowerment or “a tree falling in the wood that no 
one hears”? 
 
The interviewees often related channels for increased interaction and connection – 
like comments, groups, petitions, and online campaigns – to agents on the right of 
the political spectrum, whose trust in media is statistically low. Their engagement 
in online MA practices can be explained on the grounds that they lack 
representation and chances of articulation. “You [the journalists] never give me the 
microphone” (l. 206), claims Medad from the right-wing watchdog IMW. In Israel, 
there are several online campaigns in which users connect via the petition platform 
Atzuma (atzuma.co.il) or in FB groups (Tausig & Persico, l. 487). The interviewees 
were presented with two identified examples to comment on.21 Although one of the 
examples was familiar to most of the interviewees, the general impact of user 
campaigns and FB groups was assessed as marginal or non-existent: “It is like a 
tree falling in the wood that no one hears – it can be 35.000, it can be 30 million. If 
the papers don't write about it, nobody knows it” (ibid., l. 660ff). This point of view 
contrasts with the assumption that journalistic agents in the field of power cannot 
control criticism anymore in the light of online communication. 
However, the aggregation of audience criticism by Israel’s Media Watch (IMW) 
offers a different picture, illustrating how the technical potential can increase the 
influence of MA practices in combination with social and political capital. Medad, 
a member of IMW’s executive board and well-connected to the political 
establishment, explains how they campaigned with the help of an online complaint 
                                                 
21 The first example was a FB group called “smolbogdim” that is aimed at monitoring “the leftist 
mainstream media” with around 6,340 likes, which was unknown to all interviewees. The second 
example was a campaign on Atzuma directed against the journalist and anchor woman Yonit Levy, 
with 35,000 supporters. The claim was that Levy lacked objectivity by expressing too much 
empathy with Palestinians during the “Operation Cast Lead” in 2009 in Gaza. Most interviewees 
were familiar with this example.  
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function on its website and online banners.22 The aggregation of criticism 
enhances the organization’s credibility and legitimacy, explains Medad:  
 
“Online we are getting a lot of complaints that make us more powerful because instead of 
saying ‘it is Mr. Medad, or Mr. Cohen, and Mrs. Schwartz in the office – and they are right-
wing fanatics‘, we are truly representative of the public life. It is the people now who is 
talking. And that gave us enough power and we went back into the Knesset23 Committee, or 
to media conferences. We are now not just hundreds of people from Media Watch but 
thousands of people” (Medad, l. 433) 
 
Be’er of the media watch organisation Keshev also thinks IMW is successful with 
their “crowd criticism” approach: “to influence, to make terror on the editors by 
thousands of letters of complaints, and telephone calls (…). It is effective, I know it 
is effective, such work” (l. 407f). 
 
Real time criticism: “An immediate response on the spot” (Keshev) 
 
The media watch organisation Keshev was founded two years after the attack on 
Israel’s Prime Minister Rabin in 1995, driven by the feeling “that the real threat on 
our society is not only from the outside, from Arab countries or the Palestinians 
but from the inside, the underground antidemocratic streams – and one big issue 
is the media” (Be’er, l. 11). According to Be’er, the website is the most valuable tool 
for media criticism because it provides the opportunity for making a direct 
reference to the criticised objects (l. 115). In 2009, during the outbreak of violence 
in Gaza, Keshev started to engage in real time media criticism:  
 
“What we did was an immediate response on the spot of the media coverage of every day. 
Every day we published a summary or conclusion from the last day of coverage and we 
showed cases of self-censorship and bias, and how journalists were based on only one 
source of information, the military spokesperson, and how they completely ignored other 
sources” (ibid., l. 83ff) 
 
Especially circles of renowned journalists, explains Be’er, reacted to the critical 
analysis. The senior journalists saw their reputation as being independent from the 
military being brought into question, and began to justify themselves:  
 
“I got telephone calls from some senior journalists, some very honourable journalists, who 
(…) said: ‚It is very important what you do, but look, I am not like the others, I was ok, if 
you take a look today at eleven o'clock in the news broadcast, I said that and this, I used 
several sources of information, I criticised the army. (…) For senior journalists it was very 
important to show that they don't belong to the military spokesperson, that they are not the 
loud speakers of the army” (ibid., l. 89ff.) 
 
This example of journalists defending themselves illustrates how synchronic 
criticism on the spot can work especially on journalists for whom symbolic capital 
                                                 
22 As an example he mentions a campaign against the journalist Gabi Gazit who offended the 
ultraorthodox population of Israel. According to Medad, their campaign “drove him from one radio 
station to the other” (Medad, l. 416ff). 
23 The Knesset is the Israeli Parliament.  
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is at stake; and that “an institute, a kind of watchdog watching the media around 
the clock” (l. 98ff) can indeed benefit from online communication to increase its 
scope of action. 
 
Range and symbolic capital: The Seventh Eye Journal  
 
The Seventh Eye Journal (7th Eye; Hebrew: Haayin Hashviit) is defined as a 
“watchdog for Israeli media” (Tausig & Persico, l. 4) and a “non-profit 
organisation” (ibid., l. 7) by its editors Shuki Tausig and Oren Persico. The non-
profit orientation allows them a “special perspective on the Israeli media” (ibid.). 
The journal is financed by the liberal think tank IDI and is aimed at “foster[ing] 
our [the IDI’s] agenda” (Altshuler, l. 30ff).  
In the context of MA or media criticism in Israel, almost all interviewees 
mentioned and valued the 7th Eye : “it definitely has a very good reputation among 
journalists and academics“, says Liven (l. 192); it would be “sophisticated” 
(Schneider, l. 362) and “an important and interesting website that people should 
definitely follow” (Blau, l. 178). Editor Tausig claims that the 7th Eye was 
prestigious as a printed journal but that since they launched their website, its 
impact on the journalistic field has increased and its range has extended: 
 
“When we were a print magazine (…) people of the media business knew that this magazine 
exists and it was respected. But now I think they fear us. (…). But it is also a different 
audience. It used to be only academics and senior journalists (…). I think it is now the 
whole media industry and we want to address non-journalists also” (Tausig & Persico, l. 
98ff) 
 
This assumption is also shared by other interviewees (e.g. Shargal). Besides the 
facts that the ownership of means of production is not necessary anymore and 
publication has become easier (ibid., Tausig & Persico, l. 70), the 7th Eye editors 
point to the importance of SNS, especially FB, through which almost half of the 
audience comes to the site (l. 155). The 7th Eye’s influence become manifest in the 
target’s reactions: 
 
“Every big article we are publishing is followed – or even before the publication – by sue 
threats with a ridiculous amount of money. And they try to fight us in other channels also, 
by threatening our publisher which is the Israeli Democracy Institute. The media outlets 
threaten them that they will not cover them anymore if they won't force us to change the 
article” (l. 253ff). 
 
The 7th Eye’s MA practices are exerting power in the media field that even reaches 
the dominant agents at the heteronomous pole.24 Online communication has 
enabled the 7th Eye to unfold its high amount of incorporated media capital and 
symbolic power that has been restricted when it was a print product. 
                                                 
24 As a concrete example, Tausig & Persico name a series of articles that criticised the bias of rating 
numbers that the big broadcasting channels publish based on the “Israel Audience Research Board” 
(IARB). The IARB threatened to sue the 7th Eye. However, the minister of communication reacted 
to the claims of the 7th Eye and announced to set up a regulation that rating numbers have to be 
published accurately (see Tausig & Persico, l. 46ff).  
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Conclusion 
 
By applying Bourdieu’s field theory as a heuristic research tool, the first objective 
of this article was to characterize the media field and MA in Israel. The second 
research question addressed the potential of online communication for MA 
practices. 
Field theory highlights that Israeli journalism functions as an autonomous field 
that follows and sets its own rules, and has a tendency to become insular – despite 
restrictions on press freedom, intersection with politics and a dominance of agents 
at the heteronomous pole. In the light of a politically polarized society, the 
dynamics of isolation become even more distinctive. MA practices are driven by 
the agent’s struggle for interpretive authority in Israel’s media field. The 
background of the agent’s engagement in media criticism is the perception that 
Israeli media has “a tremendous potency and power” (Medad, l. 231f) to shape the 
public opinion. In a conflict-laden society that has “very big questions on the 
public agenda – questions of peace and war” (Be’er, l. 266f) influencing media 
becomes “really a fight for the minds of people“(Medad, l. 231f). 
Politically motivated media criticism is both a driving force and a challenge for MA 
in Israel. When (only) political criteria are cited to judge what is journalistically 
valuable, then journalists might be more likely to reject than to respond to 
criticism. Considering that websites’ comment areas, SNS, and user campaigns are 
strongly used by citizens who feel underrepresented in the media, the tendency to 
withdraw from criticism could even be amplified by online communication – 
contrary to its potential for interactive dialogue. In addition, the online 
environment accentuates the journalists’ perception of “being watched”, which 
might cause journalists to be “more careful” (Tausig & Persico, l. 866ff). 
Considering the processes of self-censorship in Israel’s society, it is important to 
critically reflect on the consequences of effective MA practices. 
The efficiency of external MA practices seems to be bound to the amount of media 
capital. The prestigious 7th Eye appears to have improved its influence with the 
mere chance of unlimited publication on its website and distribution on SNS, while 
the audience’s “crowd criticism” via talkbacks, SNS and online petitions seems to 
be a practice of limited influence, which is particularly used by those media users 
with less media capital. However, the interviews also suggest that “crowd 
criticism” may exercise influence on journalism when aggregated by more 
powerful agents with social and political capital. This paper has addressed the 
question of impact or influence from a theoretical point of view and related to the 
perception of relevant agents in the Israeli media field. Future research could 
explore MA as a question of influence by applying in depth case studies that also 
include media content.  
This paper suggests that online communication amplifies the responsiveness and 
transparency of journalistic agents primarily when credibility and prestige 
(symbolic capital) are at stake. The observation that MA cultures differ according 
to the position in the field (heteronomous versus autonomous pole, field of power 
versus lower positions) may be an inspiration for further qualitative and 
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quantitative research on this nexus. The Bourdieuian angle helps researchers to 
understand – and to criticise – that also online users and journalists do not 
necessarily communicate on an equal level, as the technically decentralised 
structure of the internet implies. Online communication is imbedded in existing 
structures that can be changed but are also constantly reproduced.  
The research conducted for this paper did not indicate an increased engagement of 
Arab Israelis in the media field, in contrast to active online criticism voiced by 
Israelis considered right in the political spectrum. This implies that the separate 
media use of Arab and Jewish Israelis continues online. However, more research 
needs to be done that addresses MA online related to Israel’s specific ethnic, social 
and religious makeup. Field theory could help to shed a light on inequalities in 
terms of access to and representation in the media. 
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